Summary Eminism.org » “End demand” policies toward prostitution *increase* supply: an insight from development economics eminism.org
3,421 words - html page - View html page
One Line
Limited economic alternatives may prevent individuals from stopping prostitution, even if prices drop, potentially increasing the demand for it.
Slides
Slide Presentation (11 slides)
Key Points
- End demand policies towards prostitution may increase supply under certain conditions.
- Prostitution market has low downward price elasticity of supply.
- People in the sex trade often lack viable economic alternatives.
- Reduction in demand does not change the circumstance for those in the sex trade.
- Decrease in demand leads to an increase in supply due to lack of alternatives.
Summaries
18 word summary
End demand policies may increase prostitution as limited economic alternatives prevent individuals from stopping even if prices drop.
65 word summary
End demand policies to reduce commercial sex may increase prostitution due to a lack of viable economic alternatives. The low elasticity of supply means that even if demand decreases and prices drop, individuals involved may continue due to limited options. Addressing economic injustices and providing alternatives, rather than focusing on reducing demand, is recommended. Collaboration among economists and economics students is encouraged for further research.
137 word summary
End demand policies aimed at reducing commercial sex can actually increase prostitution in certain situations, according to an analysis of development economics. The author argues that individuals involved in the sex trade often lack viable economic alternatives, resulting in a low elasticity of supply. Even if the demand for prostitution decreases and prices drop, those involved may continue due to a lack of options. The author draws parallels between the prostitution market and labor markets in developing nations, where a decrease in wages can lead to an increase in working hours. The findings suggest that end demand policies may not effectively reduce the supply of commercial sex and harm those they aim to help. Instead, addressing economic injustices and providing viable alternatives should be the focus. Collaboration among economists and economics students is encouraged for further research.
411 word summary
End demand policies aimed at reducing commercial sex may actually lead to an increase in prostitution in certain circumstances. This conclusion is based on an analysis of development economics and the unique characteristics of the prostitution market. The author argues that individuals involved in the sex trade often lack viable economic alternatives, resulting in a low elasticity of supply. Consequently, even if the demand for prostitution decreases and prices drop, those in the sex trade may continue their involvement due to a lack of other options. In some cases, a decrease in demand can actually result in an increase in supply.
The author draws parallels between the prostitution market and labor markets in developing nations, where a decrease in wages can lead to an increase in working hours as households try to compensate for lower income. Similarly, individuals involved in the sex trade face a trade-off between generating income through sex work and engaging in other activities such as child-raising, education, and leisure.
To illustrate these concepts, the author presents supply and demand charts. In scenarios with low elasticity of supply, a decrease in demand leads to a smaller decrease in the quantity of sex traded compared to scenarios with high elasticity of supply. The author also suggests that the zero elasticity scenario, where individuals in the sex trade have no viable alternatives, is not unrealistic, particularly for those in the lower end of the prostitution market. In this scenario, a decrease in demand results in lower income but does not significantly reduce the prevalence of prostitution.
These findings have significant implications for end demand policies. The author argues that such policies harm those they aim to help and may not effectively reduce the supply of commercial sex in the long term. Instead, addressing economic injustices and providing viable alternatives should be the primary focus. Furthermore, the author encourages economists and economics students to collaborate on further research using public information such as online sex ads and arrest records to test this hypothesis.
In conclusion, end demand policies towards prostitution can unintentionally increase supply under certain conditions. Due to the low elasticity of supply and the trade-off faced by individuals involved in the sex trade, a decrease in demand may not lead to a significant reduction in the quantity of sex traded. This insight challenges prevailing assumptions about the effectiveness of end demand policies and emphasizes the necessity of addressing economic injustices rather than solely targeting the demand for commercial sex.
440 word summary
End demand policies towards prostitution, which aim to reduce demand for commercial sex, may actually increase prostitution under certain conditions. This insight comes from an analysis of development economics and the unique characteristics of the prostitution market. The author argues that the supply side of the prostitution market is often made up of individuals who lack viable economic alternatives, leading to a low elasticity of supply. This means that even if the demand for prostitution decreases and the price goes down, those in the sex trade may still continue to engage in it due to a lack of other options. In fact, the author suggests that under certain circumstances, a decrease in demand may lead to an increase in supply.
The analysis draws parallels with labor markets in developing nations, where a decrease in wages can lead to an increase in working hours as households try to compensate for the lower income. The author argues that households and individuals in the sex trade face a similar trade-off between generating income through sex work and engaging in other activities such as child-raising, education, and leisure.
The author presents supply and demand charts to illustrate these concepts. In a scenario with low elasticity of supply, a decrease in demand leads to a smaller decrease in the quantity of sex traded compared to a scenario with high elasticity of supply. The author also suggests that the zero elasticity scenario, where individuals in the sex trade have no viable alternatives, is not unrealistic, especially for those in the lower end of the prostitution market. In this scenario, a decrease in demand leads to lower income but does not significantly reduce the prevalence of prostitution.
The implications of this analysis are significant for end demand policies. The author argues that such policies harm those they aim to help and may not succeed in reducing the supply of commercial sex in the long term. Instead, addressing economic injustices and providing viable alternatives should be the focus. The author also invites economists and economics students to collaborate on further research to test this hypothesis using public information such as online sex ads and arrest records.
In conclusion, end demand policies towards prostitution may inadvertently increase supply under certain conditions. The low elasticity of supply in the prostitution market, coupled with the trade-off faced by those in the sex trade, means that a decrease in demand may not lead to a significant decrease in the quantity of sex traded. This insight challenges the prevailing assumptions about the effectiveness of end demand policies and highlights the need to address economic injustices rather than targeting the demand for commercial sex.