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John Fischer challenges the traditional view of human freedom under causal determinism, examining the consequences for morality and practical decision-making.
Slides
Slide Presentation (7 slides)
Key Points
- The text explores the relationship between free will and various moral notions, such as deliberation, practical reasoning, moral responsibility, and ethical concepts
- The author challenges the common-sense view that humans have freedom involving alternative possibilities and examines the implications of this challenge
- The author disagrees with the notion that one cannot engage in deliberation if they do not believe in free will, arguing that there would still be a clear point to engaging in deliberation even if one believes that antecedent mental states are causally sufficient for their decision
- The text discusses the causal efficacy of practical reasoning and the Kantian approaches to practical reasoning, contending that an agent engaged in practical reasoning can acknowledge that their choice is causally determined and deliberate about which choice to make
- The text explores the concept of moral responsibility and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), presenting a dilemma for the Frankfurt-type examples and a response to that dilemma, as well as addressing a recent objection and providing a further reply
Summaries
18 word summary
John Fischer challenges common-sense view of human freedom under causal determinism, exploring implications for morality and practical reasoning.
63 word summary
John Fischer challenges the common-sense view of human freedom under causal determinism, exploring its implications for morality. He disagrees with Taylor and van Inwagen's argument that deliberation requires belief in free will, and examines John Searle's argument against practical reasoning. Fischer also discusses the causal efficacy of practical reasoning and moral responsibility, and explores the impact of causal determinism on our moral lives.
130 word summary
John Fischer, a philosopher at the University of California at Riverside, challenges the common-sense view of human freedom involving alternative possibilities, given causal determinism. He explores the implications for morality and argues that no one knows if causal determinism is true. Fischer disagrees with Taylor and van Inwagen's argument that deliberation requires belief in free will, contending that practical reasoning still has value without free will. He examines John Searle's argument against practical reasoning under causal determinism, but disagrees, suggesting an epistemic gap may be necessary. Fischer also discusses the causal efficacy of practical reasoning and moral responsibility, including Frankfurt-type examples and source incompatibilism. He concludes by exploring the impact of causal determinism on our moral lives and whether it would require us to jettison aspects of our moral understanding.
398 word summary
John Fischer, a philosopher at the University of California at Riverside, challenges the common-sense view that humans have freedom involving alternative possibilities, particularly in light of the doctrine of causal determinism. He explores the implications of this assumption for morality and argues that no human currently knows whether or not causal determinism holds.
Fischer discusses the views of Taylor and van Inwagen, who argue that one cannot engage in deliberation without believing in free will. However, Fischer disagrees and believes that there is still a clear point to deliberation and practical reasoning, even if one rejects free will involving alternative possibilities. He also examines John Searle's argument that there would be no point to practical reasoning or deliberation if one knew that causal determinism were true. Fischer disagrees and argues that practical reasoning may require an epistemic gap.
The text explores the causal efficacy of practical reasoning and Kantian approaches to it. Fischer contends that an agent engaged in practical reasoning can acknowledge that their choice is causally determined and deliberate about which choice to make. The concept of moral responsibility and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) are also discussed, along with Frankfurt-type examples and objections to them.
Causal determination raises questions about moral responsibility and the relevance of alternative possibilities. Frankfurt-type scenarios suggest that the ability-undermining factor does not play a role in the actual sequence leading to relevant choices and actions. Source incompatibilism explores whether alternative possibilities are relevant to moral responsibility, but does not necessarily ground moral responsibility.
Judgments of deontic morality are connected to moral responsibility. Some philosophers argue that causal determinism is compatible with moral responsibility, but not with judgments employing obligation, ought, ought not, right, and wrong. The argument for the incompatibility of judgments of deontic morality with causal determinism is based on the idea that it would be unfair to morally require someone to do something if they cannot do it.
The collapse of an agent's epistemic possibilities and metaphysical possibilities into one set would significantly alter our understanding of deliberation, moral responsibility, and ethical judgments. This distinction explains how moral requirements can guide action, even in a causally deterministic world. The article concludes by exploring the impact of causal determinism on our picture of ourselves and our moral lives, raising questions about whether we would need to jettison any aspects of our moral lives if causal determinism were true.
520 word summary
John Fischer, a philosopher at the University of California at Riverside, examines the link between free will and moral concepts such as deliberation, practical reasoning, moral responsibility, and ethical ideas like 'ought', 'right', 'wrong', 'good', and 'bad'. He challenges the common-sense view that humans have freedom involving alternative possibilities, particularly in light of the doctrine of causal determinism, which asserts that every event is deterministically caused by some past event. Fischer argues that no human currently knows whether or not causal determinism holds, and he explores the implications of this assumption for morality.
Fischer discusses the views of Taylor and van Inwagen, who argue that one cannot engage in deliberation without believing in free will. However, Fischer disagrees and believes that there is still a clear point to deliberation and practical reasoning, even if one rejects free will involving alternative possibilities. He also examines John Searle's argument that there would be no point to practical reasoning or deliberation if one knew that causal determinism were true. Fischer disagrees and argues that practical reasoning may require an epistemic gap.
The text explores the causal efficacy of practical reasoning and Kantian approaches to it. Fischer contends that an agent engaged in practical reasoning can acknowledge that their choice is causally determined and deliberate about which choice to make. The concept of moral responsibility and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) are also discussed, along with Frankfurt-type examples and objections to them. The text concludes by suggesting that one needs to look in a different direction if one seeks to argue that causal determination threatens moral responsibility in virtue of ruling out alternative possibilities.
Causal determination raises questions about moral responsibility and the relevance of alternative possibilities. Frankfurt-type scenarios suggest that the ability-undermining factor does not play a role in the actual sequence leading to relevant choices and actions. Source incompatibilism explores whether alternative possibilities are relevant to moral responsibility, but does not necessarily ground moral responsibility. Philosophers have explored various ways in which causal determination in the actual sequence rules out moral responsibility, but none of the arguments are particularly strong.
Judgments of deontic morality are connected to moral responsibility. Some philosophers argue that causal determinism is compatible with moral responsibility, but not with judgments employing obligation, ought, ought not, right, and wrong. The argument for the incompatibility of judgments of deontic morality with causal determinism is based on the idea that it would be unfair to morally require someone to do something if they cannot do it. Another argument is based on meta-ethical considerations about the point of moral requirements. However, these arguments fail to provide a compelling motivation for the Maxim.
The collapse of an agent's epistemic possibilities and metaphysical possibilities into one set would significantly alter our understanding of deliberation, moral responsibility, and ethical judgments. This distinction explains how moral requirements can guide action, even in a causally deterministic world. The article concludes by exploring the impact of causal determinism on our picture of ourselves and our moral lives, raising questions about whether we would need to jettison any aspects of our moral lives if causal determinism were true.
904 word summary
John Fischer, a philosopher at the University of California at Riverside, explores the relationship between free will and various moral notions, such as deliberation and practical reasoning, moral responsibility, and ethical concepts like 'ought', 'right', 'wrong', 'good', and 'bad'. He begins by discussing the natural understanding of freedom of the will and challenges to the common-sense view that humans have freedom involving alternative possibilities. One of the most important challenges comes from the doctrine of causal determinism, which asserts that every event is deterministically caused by some event in the past.
Fischer contends that no human being currently knows whether or not the doctrine of causal determinism obtains. He explores the implications of this assumption and focuses on the question of what would follow, in terms of morality, if humans lack the sort of free will that involves alternative possibilities. Fischer also considers whether there are features of causal determinism which would threaten morality, apart from its ruling out free will.
Fischer discusses the views of Taylor and van Inwagen, who argue that it is a conceptual truth that one cannot engage in deliberation if they do not believe that they have free will. However, Fischer disagrees with this notion and believes that there would still be a clear point to deliberation and practical reasoning, even if one rejects the idea of free will involving alternative possibilities. He argues that there is a clear point to engaging in deliberation, even if one believes that antecedent mental states are causally sufficient for their decision.
Fischer also examines John Searle's argument that there would be no point to practical reasoning or deliberation if one knew that causal determinism were true. Searle contends that the gap between our conscious decision making and acting is an essential characteristic of conscious decision making. However, Fischer disagrees with Searle's view and argues that practical reasoning may require an epistemic gap; it may be necessary that we not know exactly what we will choose and do, in order for there to be a point to practical reasoning (and deliberation).
In summary, Fischer challenges the common-sense view that humans have freedom involving alternative possibilities and explores the implications of this challenge for deliberation, moral responsibility, and ethical notions. He disagrees with the notion that one cannot engage in deliberation if they do not believe in free will and argues that there would still be a clear point to engaging in deliberation, even if one believes that antecedent mental states are causally sufficient for their decision.
The text discusses the causal efficacy of practical reasoning and the Kantian approaches to practical reasoning. The author contends that an agent engaged in practical reasoning can acknowledge that their choice is causally determined and deliberate about which choice to make. The text also explores the concept of moral responsibility and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). It presents a dilemma for the Frankfurt-type examples and a response to that dilemma. The author also addresses a recent objection and provides a further reply. The text concludes by suggesting that one needs to look in a different direction if one seeks to argue that causal determination threatens moral responsibility in virtue of constituting a way of ruling out alternative possibilities.
Causal determination raises questions about moral responsibility and the relevance of alternative possibilities. Frankfurt-type scenarios suggest that the ability-undermining factor does not play a role in the actual sequence leading to relevant choices and actions. Source incompatibilism explores whether alternative possibilities are relevant to moral responsibility, but does not necessarily ground moral responsibility. Causal determinism is a thesis about the actual sequence and does not follow from the falsity of (PAP) that it is compatible with moral responsibility. Philosophers have explored various ways in which causal determination in the actual sequence rules out moral responsibility, but none of the arguments are particularly strong.
Judgments of deontic morality are connected to moral responsibility. Some philosophers argue that causal determinism is compatible with moral responsibility, but not with judgments employing obligation, ought, ought not, right, and wrong. The argument for the incompatibility of judgments of deontic morality with causal determinism is based on the idea that it would be unfair to morally require someone to do something if they cannot do it. Another argument is based on meta-ethical considerations about the point of moral requirements. However, these arguments fail to provide a compelling motivation for the Maxim.
The distinction between an agent's epistemic possibilities and metaphysical possibilities is crucial to understanding practical reasoning and deliberation in a causally deterministic world. The collapse of these two sets into one would be as dramatic as the collapse of the wave pocket in quantum mechanics. The difference between an agent's epistemic possibilities and metaphysical possibilities explains how moral requirements can guide action, even in a causally deterministic world.
The article concludes by exploring the impact of causal determinism on our picture of ourselves and our moral lives. It discusses various philosophers' views on whether causal determinism is compatible with moral responsibility and ethical judgments. The collapse of epistemic and metaphysical possibilities into one set would significantly alter our understanding of deliberation, moral responsibility, and ethical judgments. The article raises questions about whether we would need to jettison any of these aspects of our moral lives if causal determinism were true. The collapse of these two sets into one would fundamentally change our understanding of practical reasoning and deliberation in a causally deterministic world.